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1. Intro duction
At the 1992 General Assembly of CODESRIA,1 Archie Mafeje,the South
African social scientist, presented a paper with the sub-title: ‘Breaking bread
with my fellow-travellers’. The paper itself was vintage Mafeje: an eloquently
written tour de force, which took no prisoners; but (and this is my point of
departure) it was a discourse defined by its sub-title. It was ‘breaking bread’
with people with whom, as academic and public intel lec tuals, he shared
common cause and aspira tions about the continent and its peoples. I could well
sub-title my presen tation ‘Breaking bread with my fellow-travellers’ but that
would not be quite original. If not as subtitle, at least as sub-text, I would like to
engage in breaking bread with fellow-travellers. Breaking bread with one’s
fellow-travellers may suggest different entry-points and takes on a subject but
there is a shared concern with nourishing all those who partake in the meal. Like 
a Bedouin evening meal, it is also not something to be rushed.
Thinking through the future of Rhodes University and breaking bread with
fellow-travellers around the subject will not suggest a singu larity of
perspective, objective or entry-point. Ultimately it is about a contested terrain
of aspira tions, hopes, and means of realising both. My entry-point is the Vision
Statement of the University, which includes:
Rhodes Univer sity’s vision is to be an outstanding inter na tion ally-respected academic
insti tution which proudly affirms its African identity and which is committed to
democratic ideals, academic freedom, rigorous schol arship, sound moral values and
social respon si bility.
The emphasis of my discussion will be on the segment of the statement that
speaks of Rhodes University proudly affirming its African identity. This is for
two reasons. First, it was not always so. The commitment to proudly affirming
its identity as an African insti tution was published in 20012 for the first time. It
was only in 1991, its 87th year of existence, that Rhodes University first
affirmed a ‘recogni[tion of its southern African setting’ – which lasted until
2000. The critical change in the 2000 Vision Statement is primarily about
commitment to affirming the African identity.
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Second, Rhodes had, much earlier than 1991 or 2001, affirmed ‘values’ that
were premised on its having ‘a history of high achievement and [being] an insti -
tution committed to meeting the challenges of the present and the future’.3
Much earlier in 1983, the Academic Freedom Committee had ‘re-affirmed [its]
belief in academic freedom’ involving access to the university without regard
to creed or colour’; the univer sity’s obligation ‘to guarantee the rights of partic -
i pants in the oppor tu nities and privi leges made available by belonging to a
univer sity’. It was also premised on the acknowl edgment that ‘free univer sities
cannot exist in an unfree society’. Again, it was not always so!
These shifts and moves from collusion with regimes of race-based
oppression and privilege were themselves the results of rapidly changing
environ ments (internal and external to the university) in which the university
was operating. The philo sophical discourses on the nature of questions, alter -
native moral dilemmas, and ethics of resis tance in comfortable disen gagement
from active commitment to the side of the oppressed and disposed, must come
across as sterile when 15 and 16 year-olds in South Africa’s townships were
willing to defend their own freedom and right to dignity with their lives. The
walk to becoming what Neville Alexander called a normal society was long and 
arduous.
Rhodes’s vision of affirming its ‘African identity’ raises two comple -
mentary questions: What does it mean to affirm one’s African identity? And in
the case of a university, what does it mean to be an African university? A Vision 
Statement is aspirational. As in such efforts, realising a vision requires a clear
under standing of (a) the ‘current state’, (b) the ‘desired state’, and (c) the
trajectory or path of moving from current to desirable state. Path-dependency is 
something easily recog nised in Devel opment Studies generally, and Devel -
opment Economics specif i cally. It is equally true that the essence of identi fying 
the possible problem of path-dependency is precisely to help shift the trajectory 
or devel opment path. Breaking bread with fellow-travellers, committed to the
insti tu tional Vision, requires that we open up the space for a critical reflection
on the nature of not only the current state but the possible trajec tories of arriving 
at the desired state.
Venturing into the space of ‘breaking bread’ is appro priate because not only
is the possi bility of change available, so too is insti tu tional will. Nothing
highlights this better than the recent acknowl edgment, when raised by a few
members of staff, that Rhodes’s 12 September ‘Founders’ Day’ had more to do
with the hoisting of the settler imperial flag in what became Rhodesia than with
anything that happened in Grahamstown in 1904 or after. The swift response of
the Vice-Chancellor, Senate, and Council to the complaint and the subse quent
change of the Founders’ Day is an eloquent testimony to the insti tu tional will.
For the purposes of my discussion of realising the vision, I will limit myself
to two sets of challenges: the discursive and insti tu tional. I do this in the context
of answering the two questions I highlighted earlier: What does it mean to
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affirm one’s African identity? And what does it mean to be an African
University? What are the prevailing discursive and insti tu tional challenges that
need to be overcome in facil i tating the reali sation of the vision?
2. Africanity, African Identity and African University
Given the racial classi fi catory system that under scored settler colonial and
Apartheid systems, and the retention of race classi fi cation in post-1994 South
Africa, the word ‘African’ may have specific and limited effectivity. While
collective self-description by non-Europeans as ‘Black’ was a distinct legacy
of the Black Consciousness Movement, ‘African’, ‘black’ or ‘Black African’
have more restrictive meanings. They aim to refer to the ‘indig e nous’ peoples
of the current geographical space that makes up South Africa. This is,
obviously, not the intention of the Vision Statement, and it is far from my
under standing of Africanity and becoming an African University.
2.1. Africanity and Afrian Iden tity
Against the vicis si tudes of race-speak and classi fi cation, I will suggest a
specific tradition of Africanity which arose from a ‘histor i cally-determined
rebellion against the domination of others’.4 What is signif icant, especially for
20th century Africa and its Diaspora, is the double-logic of its formation and
expression. On the one hand, across the continent – from Tunis to Cape Town;
from Cape Verde to Mauritius – was a forging of bonds of shared identity
defined by opposition to the imperial order. What is important is that skin tone
and pigmen tation have very little to do with this forging of shared Africanity
and African identity. It was a heritage that defined, as icons of African
revolution and liber ation, a host of individuals from Ahmed Ben Bella to
Patrice Lumumba; where Kwame Nkrumah and Gamal Nasser will share
common cause. It mattered little that neither of the pair could have been defined 
as belonging to the same racial category. As Mafeje reminds us, when Patrice
Lumumba was murdered, his family found home in Egypt. Lest this be seen a
roman ti cised miscon ception of an episodic instance in the national liber ation
project in Africa, I would like to draw attention to Africa’s conti nental organi -
sation of social scien tists, CODESRIA. People of ‘Arab-descent’ or ‘Asiatic
descent’ are no less ‘African’ than someone from the Congo. When Mahmood
Mamdani was elected the President of CODESRIA in 1998, the idea that his
candidacy could be questioned on the ground that his progen itors were Punjabi
immigrants to Uganda would have been considered as prepos terous. It was not
‘polit i cal-correctness’. We simply knew him as a Ugandan colleague (and I
dare say, comrade). Issa Shivji is as much ours as Babu Mohammed – both
Tanza nians. Nor is this a case of of a ‘black African’ accom mo dative
‘instinct’5. Frantz Fanon, a ‘black’ Martinique person, was considered as much
Algerian by the FLN leadership and the Algerian people as a ‘native’ Bedouin.
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On the other hand, there is the globally-shared affinity to Africa. Africanity will 
refer as much to people whose ancestral home is Africa, be they on the African
continent, Latin America, the Caribbean, and North America, and so on. From
W.E.B. Du Bois to Jean-Bertrand Aristide, we have people who regardless of
the tone of their skins defined themselves as Africans.
To put the issue in perspective, the premise for the shared sense of Africanity 
– hence, African identity – is not purely a matter of progen itors, descent,
pigmen tation or morpho logical differ ences. Ruth First did not enter Mozam -
bique as a European; she did as an African! Africanity crosses a host of other
fault lines. You are as likely to find Jews and Gentiles among Ethiopian
Amharic as anywhere else in the world. To reiterate the point, being African is
not a matter of pigmen tation or location: it is about being self-referentially
‘African’ – it is a commitment to Africa. It is possible to be physi cally located in
Africa but not be of Africa; it is possible to be physi cally located outside Africa
but be self-referentially African. This is what defined the global notion of
Pan-Africanism.
Further, to speak of African identity is not to speak of a single identity but as
something spatially bound and defined by commitment to Africa – although
highly differ en tiated. Again, while one can speak of a spatially-bound context,
there will be differ en tiated lines of such engagement and commitment. This has 
impli ca tions for the schol arship, intel lectual vocation, and the university.
While schol arship committed to the poor is desirable this cannot be the only
measure of it. Intel lectual vocation committed to the poor and the powerless
may be a preference but that in itself is not what defines the nature of African
schol arship or a university. Antonio Gramsci’s idea of ‘organic intel lec tuals’ is
hardly compatible with a singu larity of intel lectual commitment and practice.
What then defines a university within this context as African? I will address this 
issue at two levels – one is a matter of drawing lessons from similar ventures in
Africa and elsewhere: where colonial univer sities became ‘national’ univer -
sities. I use the term ‘national univer si ties’ not in the sense of narrow nation -
alism but seeking relevance in its locale without discon necting from the
universal idea of university, as an academe. The other is conceptual, in helping
to make sense of what is essential and immanent in the notion of univer sities
and what are the mutable aspects derived from speci ficity sociational life (or
better still lives).
It is important to remind ourselves that before Oxford and Cambridge, there
was Timbuktu – on the banks of what is now called River Niger, in West Africa. 
Although ‘not as centralized as al-Karawiyyin of Fez (Morocco) or Al-Azhar of 
Cairo’, Timbuktu consisted of a number of independent schools (‘of trans mis -
sion’). The most famous of these schools and widely recog nised as a centre of
higher learning was Sankore (Sankara). By the 14th century, these were fully
functioning insti tu tions ‘where the courses of study offered were essen tially
open to all students who could qualify’.6
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2.2. The Idea of Af ri can Uni ver sity as Prac tice
Since a Centenary celebration (such as Rhodes Univer sity’s) invites nostalgia
about history, I will draw from the field of history to illus trate three separate but
related forms of schol arship that defined the idea of an African university. Here
I draw short examples from Ibadan (Nigeria), Dakar (Senegal), and
Dar-es-salaam (Tanzania). In 1958, two years before political independence,
Nigeria had one university affil iated to the University of London. In a
population of about 45 million, the total student population was less than 600.
Since its inception 10 years earlier, it had offered History as a degree course but
it was History as it would have been taught at the University of London, Oxford
or Cambridge.
Central to the colonial historiographic project was not so much that it was
difficult to do African History as that Africa (and Africans) had no history
before its encounter with mercan tilist Europe. In 1960, the year of Nigeria’s
formal independence, Professor Kenneth Onwuka Dike (1917-1983) was
appointed Vice-Chancellor of Ibadan: the first African vice-chancellor of what
was meant to be a small, elitist, Oxbridge insti tution. The challenge for Dike
was funda men tally about the content of schol arship and relevance to national
rather than imperial aspira tions. It was national aspiration driven by the
scholars themselves not the State. History, which was Dike’s own disci pline,
became a major focus for recruiting and training new staff and students and
funda men tally trans forming the teaching and practice of the disci pline. What
emerged was the Ibadan School of History. It was one that saw oral sources not
as an obstacle but a constraint in contexts where there were no written sources.
The idea of African history was born out of this passion for schol arship that
connects local needs with a boundless spirit of excel lence and inter na tional
compa ra bility – rigour, intense peer scrutiny, and output.
I have argued elsewhere7 that while the Ibadan School of History displaced
and discredited racist colonial histo ri og raphy, it did not transcend received
histo ri og raphy: it did history as the history of great men, and sometimes great
women. Its enduring contri bution, contrary to my earlier critique of it, was not
merely method ological (oral sources as a means of doing history) but in the will
to give an African content and focus to the disci pline. It went on to produce
history from other sources, especially the Sahel and North and East Africa.
What it did, however, was to give second gener ation, postcolonial students like
me a sense of connection: connecting the scholarly vocation in secondary and
post-secondary education with my sense of my cultural and sociational space in 
the global arena. Its publi ca tions, such as Tariq, became the staple that made me 
fall in love with history. The ‘stories’ I read were my stories, told by my people
for my people! I did not encounter history as something alien ating and discon -
necting from my pre-school self and self-worth. University was an inspiring
contin u ation of what I learnt on the knees of my grand mother. The venture in
Ibadan was not only in relation to history. The whole spectrum of its offerings –
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from chemistry to political studies – was animated by this ferment.
Remarkably, all these happened when the state had very little to do or say about
who taught what, to whom, and in what manner.
The Dar-es-salaam School of History took histo ri og raphy beyond history as
the stories of great men and sometimes great women. In historiographic terms,
the problematic that the Dar School contended with was, to paraphrase it: Who
built the pyramids? Surely it was not the Pharaohs! Who writes the stories of the 
thousands of labourers, the archi tects, and so on who put up the struc tures? It
was a search for history not simply as the stories of great men/women but of
ordinary people as well. Dar-es-salaam was a haven of vocif erous left wing
activism. If nothing else, it sought to write history in a counter-hegemonic
manner. The Dar School reflected the ferment of the late 1960s and the 1970s in 
Africa and the brimming enthu siasm for the emancipatory project. If its histo ri -
og raphy was at the other end of the class spectrum from that of the Ibadan
School, it never theless shared a common commitment: the passion for an
engagement with its African context. The Dar School was histo ri og raphy with
a class attitude, but a class attitude with an afrocentric mindset.8
Cheikh Anta Diop (1923-1986), and the ferment of his version of
Egyptology, was what defined the University of Dakar. Diop’s Africanity was
shaped by what he considered the falsi fi cation of Egyptian history. Egypt was
nowhere near Senegal. So what makes this a venture in the construction of the
African university concern? The reaction to imperial racist histo ri og raphy that
drove the Ibadan and the Dar Schools also drove Diop. The effect of such racist
histo ri og raphy was indivisible, Diop would have argued. Diop’s argument was
that Egyptian civili sation was an African civili sation, in contrast to the claims
of European Egyptologists. As Director of the Radio carbon Laboratory at the
Institut Fundamentale d’Afrique Noire (IFAN) at the University of Dakar, his
concern was to apply the tools of science to valorise this and similar claims; it
was putting science at the disposal of a people. IFAN and history remain central 
to the University of Dakar’s self-identity. It is a measure of the national prestige 
of Professor Diop that the university where he worked most of his life would be
renamed Cheikh Anta Diop University in his memory and honour.
Three clusters, three method ological and epistemic foci; but all driven by a
shared commitment to their locales. For each, Africa was the locale. I wish to
argue that local relevance is never at odds with global and rigorous schol arship
and being inter na tionally reputable: a debate around such an idea is essen tially
a false debate. The assumption that a preference for the local under mines the
global is a false dichotomy. Oxford and Cambridge will define themselves as
English univer sities; much the same way as Harvard will define itself as
American. It is incon ceivable that anyone will argue that Oxford’s funda mental 
Englishness (albeit with aristo cratic preten sions) is a negation of its global
reputation. No one will consider calling Oxford an English university an
anathema; why would Rhodes becoming an African university be inher ently
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so? I am less concerned at this stage as to whether this commitment is to the
poor and the powerless or the rich and the powerful. History with a bias for the
poor and the powerless but driven by a regur gi tation of received paradigms will
still be problematic for me.
3. Realising the Vision: Discursive and Institutional Challenges
What has all this got to do with discursive and insti tu tional challenges at
Rhodes? Let me return to my premise of ‘breaking bread with my fellow travel -
lers’. This is not a matter of career hedge-betting; issues concerning university
education are, system i cally, more serious than life and death. The impli ca tions
of an educa tional system that damages the inner self of students may not
produce body counts but are funda men tally damaging nonetheless. Get things
right and the harvests are enormous for everyone. For the remaining part of this
presen tation, I will highlight a few discursive and insti tu tional challenges for
realising the vision. Many of these are drawn, analyt i cally and anecdotally,
from my experience at Rhodes.
3.1. Chal lenge One: the Lib eral Eng lish Tra di tion
A lot of stock has been put on the reputation of Rhodes University as a liberal,
English-speaking university. As Paul Maylam reminds us, there is little doubt
that when Rhodes University was estab lished it was as an integral aspect of a
much wider imperial project. Whatever might have been the political
dominance that conquest of the colonies might have wrought the ascen dance of
Afrikaner nation alism and the National Party would seem to have reduced the
political space available for English-speaking South Africans. Much of what
has come to be defined as the liberal critique of nation alism might present itself
as occupying a moral high-ground from which to condemn Apartheid, but it
does so in the context of the loss of that political space and influence. It is
important to make a distinction between three ideational strands that were
highlighted at the Critical Tradi tions Collo quium at Rhodes University in
August 2004. One is radical socialist, the second social democratic, and the
third liberal. Much of what was presented as liber alism at the Collo quium (in
much of the discussion of liberal tradition) is more appro pri ately activism of a
social democratic, not liberal, strand. Liberal tradition, especially Classical
English Liber alism that continues to be presented as a worthy tradition at
Rhodes University consti tutes a discursive challenge for realising the vision.
Frederich von Hayek9 highlighted two strands in liber alism: the Conti nental
and Classical English Liber alism. ‘Conti nental or constructivist’ strands of
Liber alism were defined by:
Not so much a definite political doctrine as a general mental attitude, a demand for an
emanci pation from all prejudice and all beliefs which could not be ratio nally justified, and
for an escape from the authority of ‘priests and kings’ (p.119).
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Hayek, as one would expect, was quite sceptical about those strands of liber -
alism that ‘profess a belief in individual freedom of action and in some sort of
equality of all men’. However, ‘this agreement was in part only verbal’, since
individual freedom and equality have different meanings from those in the
Classical English tradition. The latter has a far more perni cious focus and
intentionality, and was more attuned to Hayek’s:
The liberal demand for freedom is... a demand for the removal of all manmade obstacles to
individual efforts, not a claim that the community or the state should supply particular
goods. It does not preclude such collective action... but regards this as a matter of
expediency and as such limited by the basic principle of equal freedom under the law.10
This individual freedom, Sally11 reminded us, ‘is the bedrock of the free market
economy’. The idea of a minimal government is immanent in classical liber -
alism. What is important for our discussion here is that it is not only
Constructivist or Conti nental Liber alism that emerged in opposition to the
absolutism of the feudal order; Classical Liber alism did as well. The opposition 
to absolutism signified the contention between the emergent bourgeois/petty
bourgeois classes and the old feudal order. The difference, I will argue, is in the
reach of the rights that were argued for. In spite of the protes ta tions to the
contrary Classical (English/Scottish) Liber alism won rights for no-one outside
the class forces that it repre sented. From the rights to vote (either adult-male
suffrage for men or universal suffrage, which included women) to the rights of
workers to organise and bargain collec tively, these rights have been won when
radical social forces contested the terrain of public life and wrested for
themselves these rights. What is unique about liber alism, generally, is how
easily liberals acqui esced with the horrendous depri vation and violence done to 
the Insig nif icant Other around them. The defence of class, gender or race-based 
privi leges in the colonies was couched in the language of freedom, and equality
rather than equity. The two blocs of liber alism that I mentioned above have
coalesced around two major contem porary political forces. Classical English
Liber alism is the progenitor of Neoliberalism. By contrast the tradition and the
discourse of Constructivist Liber alism is carried on in Social Democracy.
The idea that you must oppose a government simply because it is
government carries a peculiarly counter pro ductive Hegelian mindset that
sometimes comes through as nostalgia for the ‘good old days’. Its source is in
Classical English Liber alism, and much of what counts for liber alism in South
Africa today derives from this tradition.12 In the face of Afrikaner nation alism
and monopoly of the political space, oppositional discourse derived from
Classical Liber alism would seem to occupy a higher moral ground. I will argue
that the continued adherence to this tradition has the tendency, inher ently, to
justify, ration alise, and acquiesce with injustice and inequity; and for continued 
defence of class/race/gender privi leges. Often, the defence of these privi leges
is couched in the language of individual freedom and liberty and against
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government encroachment. In the university setting, this will be presented as
academic/intel lectual freedom.
In contrast to the liberal idea of academic or intel lectual freedom, I would
like to posit the 1990 Kampala Decla ration on Intel lectual Freedom and Social 
Respon si bility.13 The Decla ration, which was adopted by an assembly of
African intel lec tuals, not only affirmed the autonomy of insti tu tions, (Section
B, Articles 11 and 12) but the obliga tions of the state to the insti tu tions
(Articles13-18). It not only affirmed the rights of the intel lec tuals to pursue
knowledge and dissem inate it but the social respon si bility of intel lec tuals and
the rights to education and  partic i pation in intel lectual activity, and so on.
To insist on minimalist government, as Classical Liber alism does, is to
hinder the possi bility of lever aging resources for validating the rights of
hundreds of thousands of young men and women to receive education – the
type of education that is digni fying to the person(s).
3.2. Chal lenge Two: Cur ric u lum Trans for ma tion and Euro-gaze
As my discussion of the experi ences of history at Ibadan, Dar-es-salaam and
Dakar indicate, central to a proud affir mation of insti tu tional African identity is
the question of what to do with inherited modes of knowledge production and
their content. When they encounter the colonial ‘natives’, colonial episte -
mology and pedagogy demand of them to ascend to the colonial metro politan
culture – or more appro pri ately, the invented cultural practices of the dominant
segments of the metropolis. This is in spite of the fact that the pedagogy itself is
under scored by the assumption that the colonial ‘natives’ may parody but could 
never be on equal footing with the natives of the metropolis.
I will suggest that this project of encoun tering the ‘natives’ produces schizo -
phrenia in those invited to do so. The discon nection between pre-school
collective memory and what is considered valuable enough to be taught in the
school produces an alien ating education – and here I speak largely of the
human ities. The schizo phrenia that results, in its worst forms, swings from
acute self-loathing to intense anger against the educators and what they may
represent. I can point to examples of the former in what currently goes under the 
banner of postmodern, postcolonial liter ature on and in Africa.
Let me pose the question more starkly in terms of the content of our
curriculum. We may not be respon sible for what St. Andrews College or
Victoria Primary School (in Grahamstown) teach, but is there a shared
awareness that much of our curriculum repro duces the fixation on Europe and
the discon nection with the collective memories of the non-European (by
descent) segments of our student body. To draw examples from the disci plines
– and I am firmly committed to disci pline-based education14 – that are most
important for me: Philosophy, Sociology, Politics, and History. Economics is
another matter entirely.
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What, for instance, is it about the philosophy we do that minimally acknowl -
edges that we are surrounded by a sea of Xhosa ontological discourses and
narra tives? The same could be said for the others, not only in regur gi tating
received epistemic frame works, but in seeking to derive nomothetic (the
universal explan atory) from idiographic (cultural, specific) narra tives of our
locale. How is it that very little is known among anthro pol o gists and sociol o -
gists about the works of Archie Mafeje and Bernard Magubane, to mention but
two? We have all heard so much about Steve Biko, but how many of our
colleagues and students have ever read Biko? When we talk about our Eastern
Cape anthro pology, how many of us and our students know of or has ever read
anything Govan Mbeki wrote about the ‘peas antry’ in the Province? At the
2004 Congress of the South African Socio logical Associ ation, we had
Professor Magubane as the Keynote speaker. It was the first time several of our
colleagues seen, met or read him. It was the first time many of our younger
colleagues had ever heard of him. The encounter was extremely mutually
beneficial for those present: sociol o gists, young and the not-so-young. Given
the resur gence of the so-called Two-Economy argument, I am not sure many
people in the policy-making arena in our country have read him or Mafeje,
consid ering that the defin itive critique of the Dualist argument was written by
Archie Mafeje in 1969, when he was Head of the Department of Sociology in
the University of Dar-es-salaam.
The point here is not simply one of lack of access; it is the repro duction of a
dispo sition that places very little value on and often refuses to engage with
alter native modes of knowledge production and outcome. I have encoun tered
course outlines after course outlines in our social sciences and human ities
where scant reference is ever made to African schol arship and social thought
north of the Limpopo. In a recent example, a gradu ate-level course was offered
in Social Transition in a department to which I was the External Examiner. If
the course had been offered in North America or Europe one would not have
been any wiser. There was a lot about Foucault and Derrida but not a single
reference to anything written on the subject by any African, Asian or Latin
American scholar that I could identify. Considering that South Africa’s
transition itself is one of the more exciting examples of the late 20th century, the
‘over sight’ was all the more confounding.
Yet, my experience is that many of our students are incredibly eager to
interact with these alter native sources of making sense of the world or intel -
lectual narra tives. Dr Greg Ruiters (Rhodes Politics Department) intro duced an 
offering in African Politics and Government last Term to the 3rd Year Political
Studies students. The effect was incredible. I can attest to similar responses
from my sociology students (under graduate and honours-levels) who tell you
that this was the first time anyone ever taught them about Africa. When our
schol arship jumps from a restricted notion of South African schol arship
(without engaging the knowledge production of the ‘natives’) to Europe or
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Brazil, etc., our students and ourselves are the poorer for it. The issue, I should
emphasise, is not European contra African. To repeat an argument made about
sociology, we cannot speak of Global Sociology when what comes through as
sociology is the ‘globalisation’ of specific European idiographic discourses –
on the back of an imperial colonial project. Two years ago, I was discussing
with a colleague (not at Rhodes) the issue of African Sociology as against
sociology in Africa. His reaction after a few moments of reflection was ‘but that
can’t be sociology’. When I asked why, his answer was, but what about Marx,
Weber, and Durkheim? To do sociology was to do Weber, Marx and
Durkheim! Note that Marx, for instance, was never self-consciously a sociol -
ogist, and Weber never held a chair in sociology. Indeed, as Ha-Joon Chang
reminds us, Weber ‘was in fact a professor of economics in the Univer sities of
Freiburg and Heidel berg’.15 Anthony Giddens invented the Trinity of
Sociology – all male, all European – and we cannot seem to get out of the
framework. If I say that I wish to present a course or a paper on German or
French Sociology, for instance, there will be no angst or suspicion of drumming 
down standards. It is an entirely different response if I raise the issue of a course
in African Sociology. Yet as Arthur Lewis claimed he was advised by
Frederich von Hayek, when he was asked to teach ‘“what happened between
the wars” [WWI and WWII] at the London School of Economics: the best way
to learning a subject was to teach it’!16 In other words, not knowing should be no 
hindrance to engaging with a subject in the trans for mation of our curriculum.
Is this a request for some cultural-nationalism? My answer is firmly ‘No’,
but is sociology about an approach to the study of society or what some dead
sociol o gists said? You need a shift in the mindset to make the venture of
exploring possible. The essential thing about paradigms is not that they shift. It
is that they are blinkers. They define the horizon of sight and cut out some
others. The same will apply to other disci plines, not just philosophy or
sociology.
Proudly affirming our African identity requires that we add to our schol -
arship (of nomothetic) ventures a desire to engage with the ideographical
discourses of our locale and get our students and ourselves not only reading
ourselves but becoming familiar with a huge body of African schol arship. The
alter native is to offer alien ating education to those that a Eurocentric discourse
offers no immediate affinity.
3.3. Chal lenge Three: ‘In sti tu tional cul ture’
A critical obstacle in insti tu tional trans for mation is the manner in which we
under stand the amorphous, yet palpable entity that we refer to as ‘insti tu tional
culture’. Often because of the tendency to confuse the tenden tious and
ephemeral with the substantive, certain insti tu tional practices are considered so 
essential that an attempt to change them will provoke consid erable resis tance.
For the purpose of this paper I wish to make a distinction between two aspects
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of what we often refer to as insti tu tional culture. I will suggest that central to
what we often refer to as ‘insti tu tional’ or ‘organi sa tional culture’ are two
distinct elements. The first aspect concerns organi sa tional and behav ioural
values that derive from the core mandate of an organi sation. These are activ ities 
essential to the mission and identity of the genre of insti tu tions to which the
specific organi sation belongs; these activ ities and values define the raison
d’être (the reason for existence). Take away those values and activ ities and the
organi sation ceases to belong to that genre.
The second aspect concerns what one will consider as the ‘sociational’
aspects of organi sa tional life and group dynamics. Borrowing from Imré
Lakatos, these sociational aspects of organi sa tional life constitute the
‘protective belt’ around the core aspects of an insti tu tion’s culture. Being
products of sociational dynamics, these practices and values may mark the
organi sation out within its genre but are mutable and are products of group
dynamics within specific contexts, spatial and temporal. While we refer to the
‘protective belt’ as defined by the ‘sociational aspects of organi sa tional life’, it
is important to keep in mind that the definition of the ‘core’ is the product of
human agency in patterns of social inter action, and that both aspects exist in a
dynamic relationship. What is signif icant about the outer, protective belt is that
it is the more mutable, more situationally specific dimension of ‘insti tu tional
culture’, but is often confused with what is immanent about an organi sation.
This distinction between the core values and mission, on the one hand, and
the peripheral, sociational dynamics, on the other hand, is important in under -
standing what needs to be protected and what could easily change in the trans -
for mation of an organi sation without under mining its core values and mandate.
They are also important for what one will refer to as the appro pri ateness of
trans for mation models in addressing the challenge of trans for mation.
Applied to a university, one will argue that central to its raison d’être are the
production and dissem i nation of knowledge. A university will be different
from other insti tu tions within the further and higher education sector, for
instance, in the centrality of knowledge production to its very reason for
existence. Knowledge production comes not only from the work of the research 
staff, but from their students as well. A doctoral degree work, for example, is
normally required to be a substantive contri bution to knowledge. The dissem i -
nation of knowledge may take different forms: from training of students17 to
applying the knowledge produced in different aspects of life. It is, perhaps in
the extension of the latter that the question of ‘community service’ comes, but it 
is of value, and essential to a univer sity’s core values, when it involves the
dissem i nation of knowledge produced. A univer sity’s raison d’être is defined
by its function of training of students, in addition to the core function of
knowledge production. Arising from these are a set of values (norms) that are
essential for the fulfilling these core mandates. For instance, the idea of
academic freedom rather than being an esoteric idea is valued because it is
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essential for knowledge production; it facil i tates the perfor mance of this core
mandate. External adjudi cation or scrutiny of one’s work is valued because it
serves the function of quality assurance in the framework of knowledge
production. So it is not enough to claim that one has discovered something, the
process and the discovery are opened up for external adjudi cation. The same
applies to a candi date’s doctoral thesis being subject to external adjudi cation
and scrutiny (to the knowledge producer). And this is where the distinction
between the ‘core’ and ‘periph eral’ comes in.
To take the example of external adjudi cation, while we accept that a
knowledge producer’s work needs to be subject to peer-scrutiny, how we
actually go about doing this may differ across insti tu tions and/or countries. A
doctoral thesis may be exter nally scruti nised by a panel of assessors internal to
the insti tution (as in the US) or by external examiners. In the case of the latter,
the actual process can vary from cases where theses are sent to the external
adjudi cators without an oral exami nation (viva voce) being required (as in
South Africa), or with a viva voce. The latter can take place in a room (as in the
UK) or in a town hall (as in Sweden). While these forms can give distinct
colourations to the specific requirement of external scrutiny (the core value),
the forms that they take is a matter of sociational dynamics that developed over
time and in given circum stances. It is possible to change the latter without
vitiating the former. Indeed the value of changing the more mutable (outer
protective layer) aspects of organi sa tional life is in the extent to which it
enhances compliance with the core requirement of external adjudi cation.
The impor tance of this model is that it allows us to make a distinction
between two sets of existing practices: those that in essence are dimen sions of
sociational dynamics but are no more than that and those that are essential to the 
reali sation of the core mandates of an insti tution. The corollary of this is that it
alerts us to issues relating to ‘appro pri ateness of model’. In other words,
whether the model of change is appro priate to what is essential about an organi -
sation. The spectres of ‘corpora ti sa tion’ and ‘managerialism’, for instance,
have drawn the displeasure of many academics not because they may not work
but that they tend to undermine the core mandate and functions of the university 
as an insti tution. The colle gi ality essential to the process of knowledge
production is often under mined by trans posing the model of change that is
derived from an environment of commodity  production. The latter is driven by
a sense of market share, profit margin, and propri etary hold on what knowledge
is produced. It may (and does) contribute to knowledge production, but it
under mines the dissem i nation process which is vital for the accel erated process 
of sharing, critiquing, and reassessment; all essential to the essential value of
knowledge production.
The relevance for Rhodes University in the quest for realising the vision it
sets for itself is to make a distinction between those practices and norms that are
products of specific location, history, and sociational dynamics; and those
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which are essential to the fulfilment of the univer sity’s raison d’être. The
impli ca tions for the vision of a university that proudly affirms its African
identity help to focus our gaze on those practices and norms that are
non-essential to the core mandate of a university and the univer sity’s sense of
Africanity. By the same token, it alerts us to the impor tance of taking our locale
seriously in fulfilling the core mandates of a university, and asking the
question: What are the specifics of positioning the university to take advantage
of these locales? Knowledge production and dissem i nation is local and global;
specific and generic. The issue is not a pursuit of either or but a dynamic
interplay of the two.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have concerned myself with a specific aspect of a much wider
issue of  insti tu tional trans for mation; in this context the vision declared by
Rhodes University of proudly affirming its African identity. I have sought to
highlight the journey to that decision. I have sought to provide some answers to
the questions: What does it mean to affirm one’s African identity? What does it
take to realise the vision? What does it mean to be an African university?
Because all these are quite vexing issues I have sought to provide a socio logical
framework for separating the essential from the transient in what we under stand 
as insti tu tional culture. Given the manner in which Africanity and African
Identity resonates within the South African scholarly setting, I have focused on
what I consider the pan-African ideas of Africanity. Further, I have flagged the
examples of three univer sities that followed distinct epistemic paths for
affirming their Africanity without under mining what is essential to the
university: its raison d’être. I believe this is important, when taken together
with the model of what we often call insti tu tional culture. While these issues
derive from the specific experience of Rhodes University, I will argue that they
are more generic to South African univer sities generally, and the more privi -
leged ones, in particular. Each of the three univer sities that I used to illus trate
the epistemic shifts in doing history (histo ri og raphy) faced the challenge of
shifting from colonial insti tu tions to national insti tu tions sensitive to their
locales and actively embracing these locales. Yet it was in doing this that they
enhanced the quality of their contri bu tions to the global spheres of knowledge
production. A lot of the specific sociational practices and ethos that derived
from the colonial reference points,18 our ‘protective belt’, fell away without
under mining the central mandate and values of an insti tution like Ibadan, are a
case in point. If anything, it was in defining themselves in the context of their
locales and relevance in a postcolonial context that they gained global recog -
nition as centres of excel lence in knowledge production and dissem i nation.19
The three cases cited also draw attention to how we under stand state/university
relations or the impetus of trans for mation from colonial insti tu tions to
postcolonial national imper a tives. The most critical periods of contri bution
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came when academics themselves recog nised the needs to embrace their
locales; these processes were driven auton o mously of the state. This is crucial
because we are often in danger of defining academic freedom so narrowly and
in a profoundly self-serving manner that we fail to recognise its corollary: the
social respon si bility of intel lec tuals. It does not need state (or extra-university)
inter vention to stimulate the latter.
I have flagged curriculum trans for mation as critical to a demon stration of
how we embrace and assert our African identity. These are often not issues that
can be forced into the class rooms unless the academics, quite self-consciously,
take the step to retrain themselves and overcome the prepon derance of
euro-gaze. This is no idle concern. If in the practice of our vocations we
promote the schizo phrenia in many of our students; fail to pay attention to the
ontological discourses and collective memories from where they come, much
less validate these, then we fail in our primary task of enlight ening and giving
our students wings so they can fly. Ultimately, it is about critical
self-interrogation.
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